What 115 Blocked Requests from DigitalOcean IPs Actually Show

๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Verified Threat IntelDigitalSpying Research Desk
๐Ÿ“… November 16, 2026โฑ๏ธ 6 min read

Twenty-three IP addresses registered to DigitalOcean appeared in one day of our web access logs, requesting paths associated with exposed configuration files and old PHP attack patterns. The selected requests received 115 HTTP 403 responses. That is a useful security observation, and it deserves an abuse report. It does not prove that 23 DigitalOcean servers were hacked. The distinction matters when describing an incident publicly and when deciding what to investigate next.

What our logs actually recorded

We reviewed a 24-hour window spanning November 15 and 16, 2026, Pacific time, across websites we operate. The source was a searchable Loki export of Nginx access events. We first selected responses with status 403 and paths matching a small set of recognizable probes: environment files, Git configuration, WordPress configuration, PHPUnit paths, CGI directories, and a PHP filename seen in a repeated sequence. We then removed duplicate events, excluded our known administrative addresses, and required at least five matching requests per source IP for the repeat-source summary.

The broad query returned 3,261 matching log records. After the repeat-source and deduplication rules, 105 IP addresses accounted for 1,092 qualifying blocked requests. Registration records for 23 of those IPs listed DigitalOcean as the network operator. Those 23 addresses accounted for 115 qualifying requests in the selected window. These counts describe the filter and time period above; they are not a measurement of all traffic from those addresses, all DigitalOcean customers, or all vulnerability scanning on the internet.

One example, 152.42.169.118, requested nested CGI and image-directory paths ending in cache.php against one of our sites shortly after midnight Pacific time on November 16. Other addresses requested paths ending in .env or /.git/config. The target names, timestamps, response codes, and trace identifiers are preserved in the private incident evidence sent to the network operator. We are publishing only representative path patterns here, because the lesson is in the observed behavior and its limits, not a public accusation against a particular customer.

Why those paths stand out

An application environment file can contain credentials or service configuration if a site is deployed carelessly. A reachable Git configuration directory can reveal repository details and sometimes lead an attacker toward source material. Repeatedly trying variations of these paths across unrelated sites is consistent with automated discovery. The nested cgi-bin and images requests ending in cache.php are also difficult to explain as ordinary page navigation. Our logs show the requested URL, the source address, the target host, and the response; they do not show the operator's intent or the program that generated the traffic.

Every request included in this analysis received a 403 response. Under RFC 9110, that response means the server understood the request and refused to fulfill it. It is evidence that these particular requests were denied. It is not a complete proof that every route on every site was safe, and it cannot establish what the same IP did to other websites. To assess compromise of our own systems, we would need to correlate successful responses, application logs, file integrity, authentication events, and outbound activity. We did not find evidence of successful access in the cited blocked-request set.

Network ownership is not server ownership

We attributed the source addresses through registration data, including RDAP records for a representative IP. That tells us which organization is responsible for the address range and where to send an abuse report. It does not identify the customer, the workload, or the person who initiated a request. A cloud-hosted machine could be controlled by its legitimate owner running an aggressive scanner, by an intruder who took over a workload, or by another party using the machine as a relay. The access log alone cannot choose among those explanations.

DigitalOcean's own guidance on unexpected outbound floods says a compromised Droplet is one possible explanation for malicious traffic. That guidance does not diagnose the machines in our sample. We have no host telemetry, account records, or response from the provider confirming that any of these particular instances were compromised. Calling them hacked servers would turn a hypothesis into a finding.

How the report was handled

We sent DigitalOcean one consolidated abuse report rather than 23 separate messages. It listed the 23 source addresses, their 115 qualifying blocked requests, the observed time range, target hosts, and timestamped examples with trace identifiers. The report explicitly said that we were describing attempted vulnerability scanning and had no evidence of successful access or compromise. The address used for the report was the abuse contact published in the relevant registration records. A Gmail message ID confirms submission of the email; it does not confirm receipt by a human investigator or any enforcement action.

The same investigation identified repeated probes from other networks. We grouped those by their published abuse contacts and sent separate reports to the relevant operators. That broader context is useful: the DigitalOcean slice was a minority of the selected repeat-source traffic, and the presence of a source IP in a cloud provider's range should not be confused with an endorsement of the activity by that provider. Abuse handling depends on precise evidence delivered to the operator able to investigate the workload.

What defenders can take from this case

Start with the server response and the exact path, not a dramatic label for the IP. A 403 to /.git/config is worth retaining as evidence, especially when paired with attempts for environment files or PHP endpoints. Keep timestamps with their UTC offsets, source and host fields, and a stable trace ID if available. Deduplicate exported events before counting them. Record your selection rule, because changing a threshold or path expression can change the headline number substantially.

Review any successful requests near the suspicious sequence through your normal telemetry and application audit trail. Confirm that configuration files and repository metadata are inaccessible from the web root. Keep software and deployed dependencies current, and make sure a blocked request does not mask a different route that still exposes sensitive content. If a cloud address is involved, use registration data to find the responsible abuse desk and provide a concise, reproducible timeline. Do not infer a customer breach from the source address alone.

For this case, the defensible conclusion is specific: during a defined 24-hour window, 23 DigitalOcean-registered IPs generated 115 qualifying requests for suspicious paths on our sites, and every cited request was denied with HTTP 403. We reported those facts. Whether the originating workloads were compromised, deliberately scanning, or acting through another mechanism remains for the provider and account owners to determine.

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The DigitalSpying Threat Intelligence Desk is composed of seasoned security researchers, reverse engineers, and blue team architects. Our mission is to publish reproducible, peer-audited threat analyses, hardware security evaluations, and defensive countermeasures.